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A N T I T R U S T
Are Issuers of and Dealers in Securities 
Immune from Lawsuits Arising Under 
Federal and State Antitrust Laws?
by Hannibal Travis
Conduct potentially 
subject to regulatory
scrutiny by federal 
agencies such as the
Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) is not
necessarily immune from
antitrust liability. 
The Supreme Court 
previously held that an
anticompetitive 
conspiracy in the mutual
fund industry was
immune from antitrust
liability because the SEC
had the primary statutory
authority to prohibit or
permit such conspiracies.
This case raises the 
question of whether
another alleged 
conspiracy—to restrict
the availability of certain
initial public offerings 
of securities (IPOs)—is
similarly immune.
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ISSUES
In a private treble damages action
under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 et seq., alleging anti-competitive
conduct during federally regulated
public offerings of securities, is the
standard for implied antitrust
immunity the potential for conflict
with the securities laws, as petition-
ers contend, or a specific record of
congressional intent to immunize
such conduct and/or past SEC
authorization or compulsion of the
conduct at issue, as the Second
Circuit held? 
Does implied immunity from
antitrust liability exist for issuers
and dealers in securities in light of
the express provision of Congress in
the federal securities laws that pri-
vate securities claims “shall be in
addition to any and all rights and
remedies at law or equity”? 
In a private treble damages action
alleging commercial bribery under
section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), are
issuers or dealers in federally regu-
lated securities impliedly immune
from suit due to the potential for
conflict with the federal securities
laws? 
FACTS
Respondents are direct or after-
market purchasers of about 900 IPO
stocks. Technology- and Internet-
related companies, including
Amazon.com, eBay, Priceline.com,
and Global Crossing, issued many of
these IPOs. Petitioners include ten
leading investment banks account-
ing for 73 percent of the total dollar
value of all equity underwritings in
the United States at the start of the
relevant period, which spans from
1997 to 2000. Other petitioners are
institutional investors, notably
Fidelity Brokerage and Janus
Capital. The underwriter petitioners
include Bear Stearns, Citigroup
Global Markets, Credit Suisse
Securities, Deutsche Bank
Securities, the Goldman Sachs
296
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 296–301. © 2007 American Bar Association.
Case 
at a 
Glance
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
American Bar Association
Group, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and
Robertson Stephens. These leading
underwriters obtained responsibility
from issuers for allocating shares of
“hot issues,” as many technology
stocks were (and continue to be),
and they formed syndicates to pur-
chase IPOs from issuers and resell
them to investors. In this way,
issuers raised capital to expand
their businesses, and underwriters
allocated IPO shares to those cus-
tomers paying the highest commis-
sions. Underwriters also preferred
buyers unlikely to “flip” the shares,
thereby reducing their price and
broadening their availability. 
Respondents have filed class actions
on behalf of all persons who bought
the relevant IPOs underwritten by
respondents during the period in
question, either directly or in the
aftermarket. Respondents allege
that petitioners conspired to inflate
aftermarket prices above IPO prices
by more than eight times the rate
prevailing in the early to mid-1990s,
before the conspiracy began. They
also allege that petitioners tied IPO
shares to purchases of additional
shares of the IPO stocks in the
aftermarket at inflated prices and
commissions, the issuer’s secondary
offerings, other less attractive secu-
rities, and/or inflated commissions
on trades in other securities. In
addition, respondents allege that
petitioners used their investment
analysts to distribute overly opti-
mistic and misleading “buy” and
“outperform” recommendations,
which inflated aftermarket prices
and defrauded investors. Respon-
dents claim in the Billing Complaint
that this course of conduct violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. 1, and in the Pfeiffer
Complaint that it violated the 
commercial bribery provision of 
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13(c). 
The district court dismissed the
respondents’ claims, holding that
antitrust liability for the alleged
conduct would create both actual
and potential conflicts with the
securities regulation framework
established by Congress and the
SEC. The court pointed out that the
SEC expressly allows underwriters
to create syndicates to allocate IPO
shares and that it has the power to
regulate the other alleged conduct.
The court also held that the under-
lying conduct is immune from state
antitrust law for these reasons. In re
IPO Antitrust Litigation, 287 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 521-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). 
The Second Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court’s dis-
missal of the complaints. The court
held that the refusal by Congress
and the SEC to immunize the con-
duct alleged in the complaints, cou-
pled with the SEC’s decision to pro-
hibit manipulative tying of one
security to another with the pur-
pose of inflating prices above com-
petitive levels, precluded a finding
of implied immunity for the invest-
ment banks’ and underwriters’
alleged conduct. The court stated
that implied immunity from
antitrust liability was not appropri-
ate in the absence of a showing that
Congress had been aware of the
underlying conduct and chose
either to immunize it from antitrust
scrutiny or to grant the SEC the
authority to actually compel the
conduct and/or expressly permit it
at its discretion. The court indicat-
ed, however, that the regulatory
context might, without guaranteeing
immunity, guide the application of
antitrust law to the circumstances
of a particular case, perhaps result-
ing in no antitrust liability where it
might otherwise exist.
On petition for rehearing en banc,
no judges of the Second Circuit vot-
ed for a rehearing. In petitioning for
certiorari, the underwriters and
institutional investors argued that
the Second Circuit’s decision 
created confusion and a circuit split
regarding whether the standard for
implied antitrust immunity in the
securities context is solely whether
the SEC exercises regulatory super-
vision over an activity (as petition-
ers described other circuits as hold-
ing), including by permitting it, or
whether courts should also inquire
(as the Second Circuit did) into
whether the SEC has actually pro-
hibited or authorized the activity 
in the past, or has the power to
compel it.
CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioners argue that implied
immunity is appropriate because
the SEC has regulatory authority,
which it has actually exercised, over
tie-in agreements and similar con-
duct relating to IPO allocations.
They also maintain that permitting
respondents’ antitrust claims to go
forward threatens to chill activities
important to raising capital for busi-
ness enterprises. Finally, they claim
that respondents’ lawsuit seeks tre-
ble damages relief that would under-
mine the remedial scheme for
deceptive and manipulative activi-
ties in the securities markets estab-
lished by Congress and the SEC.
First, petitioners point out that the
SEC has the statutory authority
under the Securities Exchange Act
to regulate syndicates led by under-
writers, as well as the extent and
disclosure of underwriter commis-
sions, price discrimination among
the customers of underwriters,
transactions fixing or stabilizing
stock prices, the allocation of shares
among underwriters’ customers
based upon the payment of commis-
sions or other criteria, and other
aspects of the IPO process. The
SEC’s authority is “pervasive” and
“plenary,” they assert, and therefore
(Continued on Page 298)
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cannot exist simultaneously with
“duplicative” and “inconsistent”
standards derived from antitrust
law. Pet. Br. at 19-20, 26 (quoting
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch.,
422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975); United
States v. National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), 422 U.S.
694, 734-35 (1975)). The SEC has
exercised its authority to prohibit
underwriters from tying IPOs to
purchases or sales of other securi-
ties, inquiring prior to allocating
IPO shares as to their customers’
expected aftermarket orders for the
shares, inducing aftermarket bids or
purchases of an IPO stock before it
is distributed, or otherwise fixing or
stabilizing aftermarket prices. 
Petitioners argue that the scope of
the SEC’s jurisdiction has expanded
since the 1960s to include the
authority to preserve competitive
conditions by establishing rules gov-
erning the securities industry and
commencing enforcement proceed-
ings in case of violations. They
thereby distinguish an important
case from the 1960s in which the
Supreme Court found no implied
immunity by virtue of the Securities
Exchange Act against a claim chal-
lenging an alleged group boycott of
non-member firms by the members
of the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
at 24 (citing Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-
58 (1963)). Petitioners also attempt
to distinguish a number of cases
refusing to find implied immunity,
pointing out that these other
statutes did not regulate the affected
industries as pervasively, instead
regulating banking, electricity, and
health care planning with a lighter
touch. Id. at 34-35 (citing United
States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973); National
Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology
Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
452 U.S. 378 (1981)).
Second, petitioners argue that the
securities markets will be damaged
if antitrust liability is imposed on
them, citing the SEC and the brief
amicus curiae of the United States.
Petitioners highlight aspects of the
securities and civil RICO laws as
passed by Congress and interpreted
by the Supreme Court that were
intended to reduce the likelihood
that markets and businesses will be
harmed by treble damages or class
actions in which fraud cannot be
pleaded properly. Allowing persons
who invest in speculative markets to
seek treble damages for their losses
in antitrust actions would under-
mine this regulatory structure and
send capital investments abroad,
they argue. Petitioners maintain
that ordinary civil juries are not
qualified to make the subtle distinc-
tions that “experts” at the SEC
might make between preventing
flipping and gauging long-term
investor interest in an IPO, which
are potentially permissible, and
parceling out IPO shares based on
fixed commitments to buy IPO
shares at a given quantity or price
in the aftermarket, which are not
allowed under the Securities
Exchange Act and the SEC’s 
regulations.
Finally, petitioners object to the
findings of the Second Circuit that
immunity may be improper where
another statute or regulation also
prohibits the conduct underlying a
Sherman Act claim, and that the
Sherman Act is flexible enough to
account for legitimate regulatory
concerns. On the former issue, they
contend that in the securities,
telecommunications, labor relations,
and aviation contexts, the Supreme
Court has held that a prohibition on
the underlying conduct does not
preclude a finding of implied immu-
nity where there is a potential for
conflict between the statutory
schemes erected by Congress. On
the latter issue, they insist that a
“jury untrained in law or econom-
ics” cannot perform an adequate
rule of reason analysis, and that in
any event the securities laws
advance interests such as promoting
capital formation that may not be
consistent with maximizing competi-
tion according to the rule of reason.
Respondents argue that the Second
Circuit’s decision to allow their
claims to proceed should be
affirmed in all respects, or in the
alternative that their complaint
should be determined to satisfy the
pleading standards for antitrust
claims affecting the securities indus-
try proposed by respondents and
amicus curiae the United States, or
that they be granted leave to
replead.
Respondents make four principal
arguments in support of the Second
Circuit’s decision. First, they con-
tend that there is no actual or
potential conflict between the
antitrust laws and either the
Securities Exchange Act or the
SEC’s regulatory authority. Second,
they maintain that their complaints
adequately allege unlawful conduct
that is separable from any conduct
that is permitted by the SEC. Third,
they distinguish the implied immu-
nity cases relied on by petitioners
as resting on statutes or agency
decisions expressly permitting the
conduct alleged to violate the
antitrust laws. Lastly, they say that
petitioners’ arguments regarding
alleged dangers posed to the securi-
ties markets by the antitrust laws
should be addressed to Congress,
rather than the courts, and are in
any event factually and legally
wrong.
The Billing respondents argue at the
outset that the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Securities Act
of 1933 both contain “savings”
clauses expressly denying antitrust
immunity to individuals or institu-
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tions that are subject to regulation
under the securities laws. The
Securities Exchange Act, for exam-
ple, provides that “the rights and
remedies provided by this chapter
shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may
exist at law or in equity….” Res. 
Br. at i, 18 quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(a). The Billing respondents
suggest that Congress enacted this
provision in order to preserve
antitrust remedies against “pools”
among securities dealers to drive up
prices in order to sell stocks at a
large profit to the public, which may
have caused or contributed to the
stock market crash of 1929. They
maintain that there is no conflict,
and no implied immunity, where
both the antitrust laws and another
federal statute condemn the con-
duct at issue. Both the Securities
Exchange Act and the SEC have
consistently prohibited the tying of
IPO allocations to additional consid-
eration, so there is no conflict and
no implied immunity according to
the Billing respondents. The Pfeiffer
respondents describe their
Robinson-Patman Act commercial
bribery claim as alleging secret pay-
ments by institutional investors to
fiduciary investment banks, in the
form of excessive commissions and
trades in “tied” securities, and in
exchange for personal benefit to the
investors. The Securities Exchange
Act bans manipulation of after-
market prices and communication
of false analyst reports, and (the
Pfeiffer respondents say) confers no
authority upon the SEC to permit
payment of excessive commissions
to underwriters in exchange for
such measures to inflate after-
market prices. 
Second, the Billing respondents
argue that their allegations of collu-
sion and conspiracy to inflate and
fix aftermarket prices are separable
from their allegations of conduct
permitted by the securities laws or
the SEC. They concede that an
underwriting syndicate organized as
a joint venture may have a legiti-
mate interest in jointly agreeing to a
fixed IPO price, allocating the risk
of inadequate purchasers at the
agreed-upon price, assessing and
enhancing demand at that price,
and organizing the prospective allo-
cation of the IPO shares. They deny,
however, that petitioners acted legit-
imately in jointly announcing tying
requirements for IPO purchases,
discussing the amount of “ladder-
ing” or purchasing at inflated after-
market prices to be imposed on pur-
chasers, and monitoring customers’
aftermarket trades and other under-
writers’ IPO allocation activities. 
This argument is directed primarily
at the suggestion of the United
States as amicus curiae that peti-
tioners’ pervasive regulation theory
of implied immunity be rejected,
but that the petition for certiorari
be granted on the rationale that
respondents’ allegations of unlawful
collusion are inextricably inter-
twined with activities that are per-
mitted under the securities laws.
The United States implies that the
respondents’ complaints should be
dismissed as relying impermissibly
on legitimate conduct, or that the
respondents should be compelled to
specify their allegations in more
detail, or that pretrial discovery or
limited or summary judgment
should be used to narrow the scope
of the trial.
Third, the Billing respondents con-
tend that the regulatory context in
petitioners’ implied immunity cases,
Gordon and NASD, was very differ-
ent than the context of their case.
Specifically, the context of Gordon
was that Congress found that com-
missions fixed by securities
exchanges could be beneficial, while
it came to no such conclusion as to
price manipulation or the mainte-
nance of “pools” to inflate the price
of stock offerings in the aftermarket.
The SEC also expressly approved
the fixing of commission rates,
which it declined to do for the tying
of securities offerings together.
Similarly, the context of NASD was
that Congress intended to restrict
the emergence of secondary mar-
kets for the “flipping” of mutual
fund shares, and the SEC autho-
rized the NASD to enact rules and
procedures to restrict these sec-
ondary markets. The Pfeiffer
respondents emphasize in particular
that Congress required the SEC to
ban manipulation in securities mar-
kets, by commercial bribery or oth-
erwise, and conferred no power to
allow it.
Finally, the Billing respondents
point out that treble damages under
the antitrust laws are necessary and
were intended by Congress to deter
and compensate victims of unlawful
actions. They compensate plaintiffs
for their difficulties in detecting and
litigating antitrust violations. The
importance of antitrust remedies,
the Pfeiffer respondents contend, is
underlined in this case by industry
“capture” of the SEC, and its conse-
quent failure to prevent tying and
“laddering” of IPO stock transac-
tions despite investigations in the
early 1960s, early 1980s, and late
1990s. The Billing respondents
emphasize that a prior antitrust
class action recovered over $1 bil-
lion for persons and entities over-
charged by market-makers and
securities dealers as a result of a
conspiracy to widen price
“spreads,” triggering a government
investigation and a consent decree. 
Regarding petitioners’ factual claim
that antitrust liability will inhibit
capital formation and drive IPO
overseas, respondents cite a report
commissioned by the London Stock
Exchange and the City of London
Corporation finding that issuers are
(Continued on Page 300)
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attracted to the London markets by
the lower underwriting and related
professional fees prevailing there
compared to New York. From this
evidence they infer that petitioners’
conspiracy to inflate underwriting
commissions and IPO prices are
damaging the securities markets,
and that antitrust enforcement is
the answer.
SIGNIFICANCE
A finding by the Supreme Court
that petitioners enjoy implied
immunity for the alleged tying and
manipulation of IPO securities will
have sweeping implications for the
financial industry, the antitrust
laws, and the future of the regulato-
ry state. First, the securities mar-
kets will be thrown back into the
relatively lax enforcement environ-
ment administered by the SEC,
potentially reinforcing an existing
trend toward consolidation of the
financial industry. Second, expand-
ing implied antitrust immunity into
any area in which there is arguably
“pervasive” regulation by another
statutory scheme or administrative
agency will dramatically cut back on
the reach of the Sherman Act, our
nation’s fundamental economic law.
Third, such a ruling will once again
express a strong preference by the
Supreme Court for regulation by
administrative experts applying
complex economic formulas over
courts and juries operating on a
common-law model to resolve dis-
putes in concrete cases using broad
congressional provisions. 
Although it is impossible to predict
whether exclusive supervision by
the SEC over allegations of manipu-
lation of securities markets will
reduce or increase the incidence of
anti-competitive conduct, the penal-
ties imposed by the SEC on persons
or firms engaging in monopolization
or collusion are likely to be a shad-
ow of what they would be in an
antitrust class action. As a result,
one of the main themes of the brief-
ing in this case is tort reform, giving
rise to analogies between this case
and prior attempts to preclude
courts or juries from adjudicating
class actions or imposing punitive
damages in large-scale securities
fraud, products liability, environ-
mental pollution, or civil rights 
cases. The investment banks and
institutional investors are anxious
to have the SEC and NASD arbitra-
tors resolve allegations of systematic
tying of securities, manipulation of
aftermarket prices, charging of
excessive compensation, bribery
and collusion, and fraudulent stock
reports. They argue that juries untu-
tored in law or economics will make
a mess of the industry and dry up
capital markets. Class counsel, by
contrast, maintain that the banks
and investors want simply to retain
their unlawful gains by denying
aggrieved parties any remedy and
capturing the regulatory process.
They paint a picture of an American
financial industry losing its global
preeminence as a result of collusion
and the manipulation of prices and
commissions and suffering from an
oppressive control by the largest
banks over the allocation, pricing,
and resale of IPO securities. 
Reduced antitrust enforcement due
to SEC supervision might also accel-
erate the concentration of the finan-
cial industry, as evidence by the
rapid decline in the total number of
banks in the United States since the
1980s, and mega-mergers in the
industry such as that between
Morgan Stanley and Dean Witter. If
collusion and concentration are fac-
tors in inflating securities prices, as
respondents allege, than a finding of
implied immunity might also con-
tribute to economic instability due
to speculative bubbles. 
The continued relevance of the
antitrust laws in the information age
may be called into question if
implied immunity combines with
other doctrines to preclude most
antitrust liability in a wide variety
of industries. As regulatory jurisdic-
tion expands, the extension of
implied immunity to any area sub-
ject to “pervasive” administrative
regulation may leave little remain-
ing threat of antitrust liability.
Monopolization and collusion may
be channeled primarily into aspects
of the business world that are highly
regulated, as the deterrence effect of
antitrust class actions and treble
damages fades away. Should the
Supreme Court abandon notice
pleading in the antitrust context, as
the telecommunications industry
and the United States suggest in this
term’s Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, No. 05-1126, that would
encourage lower courts to dismiss
many more cases before trial. 
Finally, a conclusion that implied
immunity exists in this case will
send a powerful message to lower
courts to steer well clear of the
jurisdiction of federal administrative
agencies such as the SEC, Federal
Communications Commission,
Environmental Protection Agency,
and Food and Drug Administration.
Finding implied immunity to exist
not only when a regulatory agency
mandates, but also when it simply
permits or even prohibits a course
of conduct, covers many possibili-
ties. This would reinforce a trend to
defer to administrative resolutions
of complex problems despite
instances in which political pres-
sures or conflicts and gaps in statu-
tory frameworks, lead to agency
inaction. As a result of this trend,
litigants have faced difficulties in
challenging such conduct as dis-
crimination by owners of broadband
networks against their competitors,
the greenhouse emissions of the
manufacturing and energy indus-
tries, the nicotine-delivery technolo-
gies of the tobacco industry, or tac-
tics to suppress the generic manu-
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facturing of pharmaceuticals. One’s
evaluation of this trend may depend
on whether one inclines to the view
that administrative agencies enjoy
superior institutional competence to
handle complex problems and pro-
mulgate uniform standards, or one
believes that they are simply more
subject to industry capture and
capricious statutory construction. 
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